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Unraveling yields inefﬁcient matchings:
evidence from post-season college
football bowls
Guillaume R. Fr´ echette 
Alvin E. Roth  
and
M. Utku ¨ Unver   
Many markets have “unraveled” and experienced inefﬁcient, early, dispersed transactions, and
subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. It has previously proved difﬁcult,
however, to measure and identify the resulting efﬁciency gains. Prior to 1992, college football
teams were matched for post-season play up to several weeks before the end of the regular
season. Since 1992, the market has reorganized to postpone this matching. We show that the
matching of teams affects efﬁciency as measured by the resulting television viewership, and that
the reorganization promoted more efﬁcient matching, chieﬂy as a result of the increased ability
of later matching to produce “championship” games.
1. Introduction
  Many market institutions have evolved to coordinate the timing of transactions, and to
prevent them from taking place too early, or at uncoordinated times. Some prominent examples
ofmarketsinwhichearlytransactionshavebeenaproblemaremarketsfornewphysicians,fornew
law graduates (particularly those who seek federal appellate clerkships), and for undergraduate
college admissions.
1 At some points in the history of each of these markets, transactions have
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1 See, e.g., Roth (1984, 1991), Avery, Jolls, Posner, and Roth (2001, 2007), and Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser
(2003). Roth and Xing (1994) discuss many other examples of such markets, including many centralized market
mechanisms, where as Niederle and Roth (2006) consider informal “market cultures” that inﬂuence transaction times.
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unraveled, that is, have tended to be ﬁnalized earlier and earlier in advance of when the transacted
relationship would begin (i.e., increasingly before graduation from medical school, law school,
or high school).
There are good theoretical reasons for believing that early transactions may be (at least
ex post) inefﬁcient, if information important for determining match quality evolves over time.
In such markets, transactions arranged before critical information (such as grades) becomes
available will not be able to achieve matchings as efﬁcient as could be made after the necessary
information was available.
2
Except for evidence from laboratory experiments, however, there has so far been no direct
evidence conﬁrming that unraveling results in inefﬁciently early matches (i.e., conﬁrming that
unravelingoccursevenwhenitisinefﬁcient).
3 Thisislargelybecauseofthedifﬁcultyofmeasuring
production, and how it varies with match quality, in medicine, law, education, and so forth. For
instance, there has been no way to measure the effect on the quality of American health care, of
changes in the times at which resident physicians are hired by hospitals, or even on a narrower
measure of efﬁciency such as medical costs, physician wages, and hospital revenues.
4 The same
can be said for the production of justice by judges and their clerks, the quality of education
produced by colleges and undergraduates, among other things.
Niederle and Roth (2003b, 2004, 2005) and Niederle, Proctor, and Roth (2006) took
advantage of a disruption in the market for gastroenterologists to observe that periods in which
transactions were made relatively early were marked by a decrease in the scope of the market.
During periods in which contracts were signed relatively late, the market was more national in
scope than when contracts were signed early. During periods in which contracts have been signed
early, gastroenterologists were more likely to pursue their careers in the same local market in
which they were internal medicine residents. So Niederle and Roth showed that a change in the
timing of the market led to a change in the outcomes it produced. Although a breakdown of the
national market into local markets is likely to deprive the market of its ability to ﬁnd the most
efﬁcient matches, however, Niederle and Roth’s data do not show this directly, neither in the
narrow sense of medical revenues nor in the wider sense of reduced gastroenterological disease.
We consider the market for post-season college football games, called “bowls.” In the early
1990s, the determination of which teams would play each other in which bowls was often made
when several games still remained to be played in the regular fall season (cf Roth and Xing,
1994). This meant that the teams with the best end-of-regular-season records might not play one
another, because at the time the matchings were determined it was not yet known which teams
these would be. Over the last decade this market has undergone a number of reorganizations that
have delayed this matching decision until the end of the fall regular season.
Using Nielsen rating data on television viewership and the AP Sports Writers’ poll of
team rankings, we will show that, by matching later, the chance of matching the best teams has
increased, and the result is an increase in television viewership. Television viewership is related
to both the broad measure of efﬁciency in terms of how much entertainment is provided by the
games and the narrow measure in terms of how much revenue accrues to the bowls and football
conferences and teams associated with the organization of late season matching. Because there
has been variation over the years in the rankings of matched teams, we will also be able to infer
2 For theoretical models expanding on this point, see, e.g., Roth and Xing (1994), Li and Rosen (1998), Li and Suen
(2000, 2004), and Suen (2000). For theoretical models on other issues regarding unraveling in centralized markets, see,
e.g., S¨ onmez (1999), Kesten (2005), and Kojima (2006).
3 For computation and laboratory experiments in which early transactions occur despite being inefﬁcient, see Kagel
and Roth (2000), ¨ Unver (2001, 2005), McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2005), Haruvy, Roth, and ¨ Unver (2006), and
Niederle and Roth (2006). Although experiments are well suited to showing that unraveling can occur even when it
is inefﬁcient, they do not demonstrate that the unraveling observed in the particular natural markets of interest is also
necessarily inefﬁcient. Nor do they give us any way to assess the magnitude of the inefﬁciency observed in natural
markets.
4 For medical fellowships, positions that involve a substantial training component, wages appear to be inﬂuenced
far more by other factors (Niederle and Roth, 2003a).
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how different components of the post-season matches contribute to total television viewership
of the bowl games. Efﬁcient matching, it turns out, is especially sensitive to the presence of a
“championship” game matching the two teams that are highest ranked at the end of the regular
season.
This article provides, as far as we know, the ﬁrst direct evidence and measurement of the
inefﬁciency due to early transaction times in a naturally occurring market. When the bowl games
havebeenmatchedlater,thequalityoftheteamsmatchedtobowlshasimproved,thelikelihoodof
a championship game has increased, and the total viewership of all the bowls in the late-matching
consortia has increased.
2. Short history of college bowls and unraveling
  Throughout the fall of each year, college football teams play each other every weekend, and
are ranked the following week in widely publicized polls of coaches and sports writers.
5 After
the end of the regular season, selected teams meet each other in post-season games, called bowls,
which are played in late December and early January.
Thebowlsareindependentbusinesses,eachofwhichcontrolsastadiumandmakescontracts
with corporate sponsors. Prior to 1992, most bowls had long-term contracts with football
conferences. The Rose Bowl was a “closed” bowl, in which the champion of the Big Ten
and Paciﬁc Ten football conferences played each year.
6 The Fiesta Bowl was an “open” bowl,
which each year needed to ﬁnd two teams to play against each other. The other major bowls were
“semi-closed,” with a contract to host the champion of a particular conference and needing to
ﬁnd a suitable opposing team.
7
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tried for years to prevent unraveling
of the dates at which bowls and teams ﬁnalized agreements about which teams would play in
which bowls. However, it gave up in failure following the 1990–1991 football season, in which
early matching (once again) led to poorly matched teams.
8 There was growing concern that
interest in the bowl games was waning because poor matches led to a lack of consensus on a
“national champion” that would result if there were a bowl game in which the number 1 and 2
ranked teams played one another.
To summarize the situation prior to 1992, several institutional features prevented good bowl
matches. The Rose Bowl was not involved in unraveling, as it had a long-term contract that
brought in two conference champions. Because it dealt with only two conferences, however, these
conference champions might not be closely ranked to one another (and would very seldom be
5 The Sports Writers’ Poll is sponsored by the Associated Press (AP). The (Division I-A) Coaches’ Poll is today
sponsored by USA Today/ESPN, and was sponsored from 1950 to 1990 by United Press International (UPI), and from
1991 to 1996 by USA Today/CNN.
6 The latter was previously called the Paciﬁc Eight and Paciﬁc Coast conference. The name changes reﬂected the
changing team membership.
7 The champion of the Big Eight Conference (now enlarged to the Big Twelve) played in the Orange Bowl, the
Southeastern Conference champion in the Sugar Bowl, Southwest in the Cotton Bowl, and the Atlantic Coast Conference
(ACC) champion in the Citrus Bowl (with some escape clauses in case the ACC champion was ranked highly enough in
the UPI Coaches’ Poll to be a contender for the unofﬁcial post-season “national championship” ranking in the AP Sports
Writers’ and UPI Coaches’ polls following the bowl games). Not all teams belong to conferences; the independent teams
included traditional football powers Notre Dame, Penn State (joined Big Ten in 1990), and Miami (joined Big East in
1991, moved to ACC in 2004).
8 Through the 1990–1991 season, the NCAA speciﬁed a date (colloquially called “Pick-Em Day”) before which
bowls and teams were forbidden to sign agreements. However, this agreement was widely and publicly ﬂouted, and the
NCAA abandoned its attempt to control this market after the 1990–1991 season, in which, with four games still to go in
the regular season, Notre Dame agreed to meet the still-undetermined Big Eight champion in the Orange Bowl, Virginia
agreed to play in the Sugar Bowl against the still-undetermined Southeastern Conference champion, and Miami agreed to
play in the Cotton Bowl against the still to be determined Southwest conference champion. At the time of the agreement,
Notre Dame was the number 1 ranked team in the nation, but between the agreement and the end of the season they lost a
game and fell to number 5. Virginia lost two games, and fell entirely out of the top 25 AP rankings, and to 23 in the UPI
Poll. (See Roth and Xing, 1994, and, for accounts of prior years, see, e.g., Barnhart, 1989; Harig, 1990.)
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the two highest ranked teams nationally). The other major bowls dealt with a substantial pool
of conferences and teams, but because of unraveling of bids for their open slots, these were
ﬁlled without knowing the end-of-season rankings of the teams invited to play. And because
many bowls had one position reserved for a particular conference champion, this also limited the
matching ﬂexibility of each bowl, and of the market as a whole.
The decision of the NCAA to no longer try to prevent unraveling prompted a rapid
reorganization of the market, as consortia of bowls and (enlarged) conferences formed to permit
later matchings of teams and bowls. Although there have been almost yearly changes in some of
the details of how this market reorganization has proceeded (including changes in which teams
belongtowhichfootballconferences),themajorchangescanbegroupedintothreeperiods,called
the Bowl Coalition, the Bowl Alliance, and the Bowl Championship Series. The Bowl Coalition
(BC) lasted three years, from 1992 to 1994, and included all major conferences except the Paciﬁc
Ten and Big Ten conferences, and all major bowls except the Rose Bowl. In-season unraveling
was prevented under the BC, but conference tie-ins existed for the participating conferences and
bowls. Conference tie-ins were later eliminated in the Bowl Alliance (BA) era, which lasted from
1995 to 1997. The BC and BA aimed to create a national championship game whenever one was
possible among the participating bowls, conferences, and teams. Finally, the Paciﬁc Ten and Big
Ten conferences and the Rose Bowl joined with the Bowl Alliance members to create the Bowl
Championship Series (BCS) in 1998. This is the current coalition in place. The number 1 and
number 2 teams in the country determined according to the BCS ranking system play a national
championship game under the BCS system (details of the coalition eras can be seen in Table 1).
The table shows that, starting in 1992, the market steadily reorganized to make the late part of
the market increasingly thick, that is, to allow larger numbers of teams to be potentially matched
after their ﬁnal rankings were known.
3. Measuring efﬁciency
  A narrow measure of the welfare generated by a bowl game is the revenue it generates. A
broad measure concerns the entertainment delivered to viewers of the game. These are of course
connected, as more viewers mean more advertising revenues, and so TV networks pay more
for more widely watched games. In the post-1991 era of bowl coalitions, the revenue from the
coalition bowls has been equally distributed among the participating conferences.
9 The revenue
accruing to the conferences is divided among the teams in the conference.
We use TV ratings measured by, Nielsen Media Research Company as a proxy for both
measures of welfare. A rating point corresponds to 1% of the entire TV audience in the United
States tuning in to watch a game.
10 We control the change in TV viewer population over years
using the percentage system adopted by Nielsen. We obtained the ratings from Nielsen Media
Research. We will use these data to investigate what kind of matching maximizes viewership. We
will see that a matching that leads to a championship game and to the remaining highly ranked
teams being spread among the bowls is more efﬁcient than a matching that divides the teams
among the bowls without producing a championship game. Thus, the move toward later matching
will turn out to have increased the efﬁciency of the resulting matches.
9 With two exceptions: (i) the Rose Bowl provides a separate purse for the conferences, and (ii) a second team in
the BCS bowls from the same conference brings additional revenue for that conference.
10 A rating point is calculated for the whole potential TV audience, but not for the fraction of the potential audience
currently watching TV. The data for the Nielsen Media Research national ratings service in the United States are collected
through electronic measurement meters. These meters are placed in a sample of 5100 households in the United States,
randomly selected and recruited by Nielsen Media Research. A meter is placed on each TV set in the sample household.
A meter measures two things: what program or channel is being tuned and who is watching. Meters are used to collect
audienceestimatesforbroadcastandcablenetworks,nationallydistributedsyndicatedprograms,andsatellitedistributors.
See www.nielsenmedia.com for further information.
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TABLE 2 Probability of Top Two Teams Ending the Regular Season as Top Two
in AP Poll
1 Week Prior 2 Weeks Prior 3 Weeks Prior 4 Weeks Prior
Probability .690 .586 .310 .345
Standard error .086 .091 .086 .088
Number of obs. 29 29 29 29
4. Data analysis
  ThedataconsistoftheAssociatedPress(AP)SportsWriters’end-of-regular-seasonrankings
of NCAA division I-A teams that played in the ﬁve bowls that were involved in a given year
with either the Bowl Coalition (BC: 1992–1994), the Bowl Alliance (BA: 1995–1997), or the
Bowl Championship Series (BCS: 1998–2005) (see Table 6 in online Appendix A
11).
12 These
bowls are the Rose, Fiesta, Orange, Sugar, and Cotton bowls. The data cover all seasons since
1977. As of 1985, we also have the Nielsen ratings for each bowl, the regular season average
Nielsenratingforcollegefootballgames,andtheSuperBowlNielsenrating(seeTable7inonline
Appendix A).
Table 2 shows how difﬁcult it is to pick a championship game before the regular season
ends. We look one, two, three, and four weeks prior to the end of the regular season for all years
in the sample (1977–2005) and ﬁnd the top two teams in that week (in the AP Sports Writers’
Poll). Table 2 shows the probability that these teams will be the top two teams when the regular
season ends. The top two teams three and four weeks prior to the end of the regular season will
still be the top two teams when the regular season ends only a little over 30% of the time. These
probabilitiesincreaseto59%and69%twoweeksandoneweekpriortotheregularseasonending,
respectively. Hence one to two matchups determined three to four weeks before the end of the
regular season (as became common prior to the formation of the Bowl Coalition in 1992) have
very little chance of turning into real championship games when the regular season ends.
In the pre-coalition era, a championship game was played only in four of the ﬁfteen years
in our sample (see Table 6 in online Appendix A). Note that the lack of championships in the
pre-coalition era was not a result of the fact that the number 1 and 2 teams were in bowls other
than the ones we are considering. For our entire sample, there are only two years when one of
the top two teams did not play in the ﬁve bowls we consider: 1984 when the number 1 team
(Brigham Young) played in the Holiday Bowl, and 1990 when the number 2 team (Georgia Tech)
played in the Florida Citrus Bowl. So the top two teams almost always played in one of the current
four BCS bowls over our sample of years. (The Cotton Bowl hosted one of the two top teams
only twice: the number 1 team in 1977 and the number 2 team in 1983.)
13 Therefore, the lack of
championship games in our sample is because of in-season unraveling and pre-commitments of
the conferences to different bowls.
We next consider how many of the missed championship matchups in the pre-coalition era
were because of in-season unraveling, and how many were due to conference commitments. In
Table 8 (available in online Appendix A), we inspect whether it was possible to create a national
championship bowl that would match the number 1 and number 2 teams in the country according
11 Online Appendix A can be found at homepages.nyu.edu/ gf35/print/online appendix.pdf.
12 The AP Sports Writers’ Poll is only one of the possible choices. One could also use the USA Today/ESPN
Coaches’ Poll or one of the many computer rankings. We chose the AP because it is a well-established ranking and for
reasons of data availability. We obtained the weekly and end-of-regular-season AP Poll rankings and bowl matchup data
from NCAA (2003) and Weekly AP Poll Rankings at 2cuz.com (2003) and SoonerStats.com (2006).
13 If we conﬁne our attention to the four BCS bowls, in the 11 years prior to 1992, the number 1 team was missing
once, the number 2 team twice, and the number 3 team three times. In contrast, in the 11 years starting in 1992, the
number 1, 2, and 3 ranked teams at the end of the regular season have always played in one of the four BCS bowls.
C   RAND 2007.FR´ ECHETTE, ROTH, AND ¨ UNVER / 973
TABLE 3 Frequency of Championships
Championship Was Not Possible Championship Was Possible
Pre-coalitions 0% (out of 5 years) 40% (out of 10 years)
Coalitions period 0% (out of 6 years) 100% (out of 8 years)
totheAPSportsWriters’Poll,underdifferentinstitutionalregimes.Whenthetoptwoteamswere
in conferences whose champions were pre-committed to participate in different bowls, these two
teams would not be matched, even if the bowl selection took place after the regular season was
over.
Table 8 shows that, in the pre-coalitions era, in 10 out of the 15 years in question, it
was possible to create a championship matchup despite the pre-commitments of conferences
to speciﬁc bowls. This is because most of the pre-commitments involved semi-closed bowls,
meaning that one conference champion and an at-large team could play at the bowl, and many
of the most successful teams were at-large teams.
14 The championship matchup was obtained
only in four of the ﬁfteen years. Therefore, a championship matchup was not possible because
of pre-season commitments only in ﬁve years, thus giving strong indications that the failure to
obtain a championship in the other six years was because of in-season unraveling. To the extent
that missed championships are the results of in-season unraveling in years where a championship
was possible, that effect becomes more prominent in the last seven years prior to the coalitions
era. In these seven seasons, a championship game was possible in six seasons and it was played
onlytwice.Table8providesstrongevidencethatin-seasonunravelingwasabigpartofthefailure
to create championship games in these seasons.
The different coalitions that followed had mixed success: the BC produced championships
in two of its three years, the BA in only one out of three, and the BCS in ﬁve out of eight.
Conference-bowl tie-ins prevented championship matchups in the remaining years in the BA and
BC era. Also, there were three years in the BCS era in which the rankings used to determine
the BCS championship game selected different top two teams than the AP Sports Writers’ Poll.
In the BCS era, although a championship game was played in every year, this was determined
according to the BCS rankings, while we are counting championships according to the (more
widely respected) AP rankings.
By delaying bowl selection until the end of the regular season and gradually removing
conference tie-ins, the effect that the coalitions have had on the probability of a championship
is clear and can be seen in Table 3. Comparing the proportion of the years when there was a
championship, the hypothesis that there were as many prior to 1992 as after can be rejected (two-
sample test of proportion, one-sided, 5% level). Similarly, the same conclusion can be reached
comparing the BCS years to the pre-1992 era.
15 Note also that this table highlights the fact that
there were no signiﬁcant differences in the frequency with which championships were possible
if one compares the pre-coalitions period to the coalitions period. More speciﬁcally, it was not
possible ﬁve out of ﬁfteen years in the pre-coalitions period versus six out of ﬁfteen years in the
coalitions period.
Another effect of the coalitions has been to improve the rankings of the teams playing in
the top bowls. For instance, although the Orange and Sugar bowls have had the number 1 and 2
14 It is noteworthy that with the 1990s and the establishment of the Big East football conference (which in turn
initiated the start of the Bowl Coalition era), all major independent teams but Notre Dame joined a conference and left
their “independent” status.
15 One could estimate the effect of the different coalitions on the probability of a championship conditional on a
championship being possible via a multinomial probit where there are ﬁve possible outcomes deﬁned by whether there is
a championship or not and which of the four bowls is hosting it. However, because there has been a championship every
year that it was possible during the coalitions era, the coefﬁcient estimate of that regressor would be inﬁnite.
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FIGURE 1
AVERAGE NORMALIZED NIELSEN RATINGS IN BCS BOWLS
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teams play slightly less often since the ﬁrst coalition (the Orange Bowl has received the number
1 (2) team 7 (5) times in the ﬁfteen years prior to the BC and 4 (2) times in the eleven years after,
and these numbers are 3 (6) and 3 (4) for the Sugar Bowl), the Rose and Fiesta bowls have had
an important increase: 1 (1) to 4 (3) for the Rose Bowl and 2 (1) to 3 (4) for the Fiesta. Overall,
regressions provided in Appendix A in this paper (Table 9) show that the rank of the best and
worst teams in the BCS bowls are better than in the period prior to the BC.
16
In Figure 1, we can see the evolution of the average Nielsen ratings per year in the BCS
bowls, normalized by subtracting the average regular-season college football ratings for that year.
As Figure 1 indicates, aggregate statistics suggest that the reorganizations after 1992 reversed the
declining trend in the relative popularity of bowl games as measured by television viewership.
Since the ﬁrst Bowl Coalition, the fall in ratings in the bowls as compared to the regular season
seems to have stopped.
17 This is conﬁrmed in Table 4, which presents regression estimates of
the average Nielsen ratings in the top four bowls (Sugar, Fiesta, Rose, and Orange) on different
speciﬁcations that indicate the correlation between those coalitions and the ratings controlling
for time trends.
18 The different speciﬁcations include Year, which goes from 1 (in 1985) to 18
(2002)orYearinteractedwithindicatorvariablesforpre-1992(Pre-Coalitions)or1992andabove
16 This can be established directly for the best team by the statistical signiﬁcance of the BCS in speciﬁcation 12.
For the worst, using estimates from 13, we can reject the joint hypothesis that all the year dummies prior to 1992 equal
the estimates for the BCS.
17 However, it is important to note that the regular-season ratings have been dropping (on average by 0.19 Nielsen
ratings point per year over our sample period). This series can also be seen in Figure 1. Note that average regular-season
ratings are calculated as the average of all rating points that each game gathers on all markets (i.e., the average of the
audiences for all regular-season games as a percentage of all TV sets).
18 Here (in speciﬁcations 1 and 2) the dependent variable is Nielsen ratings; it is not normalized by the ratings of
the regular season. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 are similar to 1 and 2, but the dependent variable is the log odds ratio of the
Nielsen ratings. Speciﬁcations 2 and 4 control for the average ratings of the regular season.
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TABLE 4 Evolution of Average Nielsen Ratings in BCS Bowls
Average Nielsen Ratings Log Odds Ratio
Regressors Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3) Spec. (4)
Year  .464    .261  .040    .019
(.180) (.217) (.017) (.020)
BC .38  .588  .014  .111
(1.397) (1.481) (.129) (.134)
BA 3.563  4.169   .317  .378  
(1.793) (1.766) (.165) (.160)
BCS 5.373  6.148   .510   .588  
(2.559) (2.507) (.236) (.227)
Average Regular Season 1.364 .136
Nielsen Ratings (.886) (.080)
Constant 15.076    5.669  1.812     2.752   
(0.928) (6.174) (.085) (.560)
Observations 21 21 21 21
Standard errors are in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.
(Coalitions),indicatorvariablesforthedifferentcoalitions(BC,BA,BCS),andtheregular-season
average Nielsen ratings for college football (Speciﬁcations 1, 2, 3, 4). The estimations indicate
that the fall in ratings has been stopped and have bounced back up (although not to 1985 levels).
Let us now turn to a more systematic analysis of the determinants of viewership at the bowl
level. Table 5 reports the determinants of viewership as measured by the Nielsen ratings. The
basic estimation equation is
NB,Y = a + d1CB,Y + d2OneB,Y + b1AverageB,Y + b2DifferenceB,Y + b3Best
 URB,Y
+···d3URB,Y + b4RSNY + b5SBNY + d4RoseB,Y + d5OrangeB,Y + d6FiestaB,Y + eB,Y,
(1)
where the dependent variable is the Nielsen rating in bowl B in year Y: N B,Y. The regressors
includetwoindicatorvariables:onetakingvalueoneifthereisachampionshipandzerootherwise
(C) and one taking value one if the best team playing is ranked number 1 and zero otherwise
(One). It also includes the average rank of the two teams (Average) and the difference in rank
between the worst and best team playing (Difference): both Average and Difference take a value
of zero if an unranked team is playing.
19 There is an indicator variable taking a value of one if a
team is unranked and zero otherwise (UR) and a regressor capturing the effect of the ranking of
the best of the two teams playing when the opponent is unranked (Best). This structure has the
advantage ofparsimonywhileallowingfornonlineareffectsforachampionshipgame,havingthe
number1team,orhavinganunrankedteamplaying.
20 Otherregressorsincludetheregular-season
average Nielsen ratings (RSN) and the Super Bowl Nielsen rating (SBN), which are intended to
capture general attitudes toward football and college football as well as seasons that may be
more interesting than others. Finally, indicator variables for four of the ﬁve bowls, excluding the
Sugar Bowl, are included. Given our limited number of observations, we control for time in three
different ways which vary in their parsimony. Clearly, time might be relevant, as other factors
may vary over time, such as the television schedule of the bowls. Those are controlled for with
either year entered linearly (year – 1984 to be more precise), or blocks of three years (two in the
case of 2004–2005) for every year except 1985, or time ﬁxed effects. Allowing for year ﬁxed
effects means that regular-season average Nielsen rating and the Super Bowl Nielsen rating have
19 Alternatively, we could have used the rank of the best and worst teams playing as regressors, which is equivalent.
20 The same speciﬁcation adding an indicator variable for the cases in which the no. 2 team plays was conducted
and indicates that having the no. 2 team playing does not have a nonlinear effect (that dummy variable was not statistically
signiﬁcant).
C   RAND 2007.976 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE 5 Estimates of the Determinants of Nielsen Rating of a Bowl
Nielsen Rating of a Bowl
Regressors Spec. (5) Spec. (6) Spec. (7) Spec. (8) Spec. (9) Spec. (10)
Championship (no. 1 vs. no. 2) 3.320   3.385   3.751    3.187   3.335  4.969  
(1.348) (1.347) (1.389) (1.475) (1.741) (2.075)
No. 1 Ranked Team 3.166   3.154   2.886    3.229   2.901   2.290 
(1.357) (1.381) (1.050) (1.249) (1.354) (1.339)
Average rank (if unranked  .375     .375     .404     .331   .382   .389  
team is not playing) (.067) (.070) (.103) (.164) (.198) (.178)
Difference in Rank (if unranked .103 .107 .137  .106  .083  .074
team is not playing) (.066) (.072) (.098) (.110) (.139) (.158)
Rank of Best Team (if unranked  .006  .009  .059 .345  .452   .638 
team is playing) (.035) (.046) (.225) (.195) (.189) (.355)
Unranked Team  6.262     5.934     6.526    8.891     10.674     13.666   
(.848) (.762) (2.854) (2.629) (2.964) (4.337)
Regular-Season College Football  .403 .724  1.657     1.177
Average Nielsen Rating (.584) (.454) (.536) (.966)
Super Bowl’s Nielsen Rating .223 .028 .254  .098
(.132) (.227) (.142) (.340)
Fiesta Bowl .561 .557 .578 2.251 2.699  2.480
(.895) (.931) (.862) (1.389) (1.445) (1.665)
Orange Bowl 1.147 1.163 1.158 3.521    3.604    3.353  
(1.103) (1.133) (.873) (1.131) (1.099) (1.502)
Rose Bowl 4.929    4.940    4.911    8.972    9.380    9.000   
(.998) (1.025) (.857) (1.397) (1.497) (2.224)
Cotton Bowl  .402  .425  .165  1.314  .738  .203
(1.008) (1.045) (.993) (1.709) (2.078) (2.075)
Year  .183  .427   
(.112) (.103)
1986–1988  2.149  2.580
(1.641) (2.439)
1989–1991  3.496   4.493
(1.853) (3.374)
1992–1994  4.309     5.107  
(.979) (2.210)
1995–1997  2.343   5.636  
(1.214) (2.018)
1998–2000  1.66  6.131 
(1.938) (3.462)
2001–2003  2.942  9.003  
(1.981) (3.389)
2004–2005  2.268  8.147  
(2.283) (3.905)
Constant 6.296 9.439 16.764   21.275
(6.625) (11.190) (7.485) (15.944)
Team dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 105 105 105 95 95 95
R2 .730 .750 .760 .890 .900 .910
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.
to be dropped. Speciﬁcations 8–10 include team-speciﬁc effects which control for the intrinsic
popularity of some teams it does; however, reduce sample size, as there are teams that only play
once in a bowl in our sample.
The team dummies are jointly statistically signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations (p < 0.1).
This does not, however, allow us to distinguish whether good teams, which happen to be famous
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most of the time, bring high ratings, or whether famous teams, which happen to be good most of
the time, are the cause of better ratings. The time ﬁxed effects are jointly statistically signiﬁcant
(p value = 0.055) in speciﬁcation 7 but not jointly statistically signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation 10 (p
value = 0.201),
21 but the null hypothesis that the time dummies in speciﬁcations 6 and 9 are
all equal to zero can be rejected at the 1% level. The average rank has the expected sign and
is statistically signiﬁcant in all six speciﬁcations. The difference in rank is never statistically
signiﬁcant. Furthermore, its sign is different when team ﬁxed effects are included versus when
they are not. When team ﬁxed effects are included, the estimates imply fully assortative matching,
that is that the best team plays the second best, the third plays the fourth, and so on, but the
other three estimates (without controls for team ﬁxed effects) suggest that the best team plays the
second best while the third, fourth, and ﬁfth best team each play in separate bowls. Note that a
positive sign on the difference regressor is not as strange as it might appear; it does not mean that
a bowl owner would prefer the worse of its two teams to have the worst possible rank. Rather,
it means two things. First, the effect of having a championship game dominates the effect of the
difference regressor. Therefore, hosting a championship game is still very desirable for obtaining
high ratings, even with a positive sign on the difference regressor. Second, if offered a choice
between a 4 versus 5 matchup or 3 versus 6, a bowl owner should take the latter. However, even
the estimates not controlling for team ﬁxed effects suggest that a bowl owner should prefer a 3
versus 5 matchup to a 3 versus 6 one. That is, the effect on the average dominates the one on
the difference. The estimate of the effect of having an unranked team is, as expected, negative.
The rank of the best team when an unranked team is playing has the expected sign without team
ﬁxed effects but then is not statistically signiﬁcant, and has a positive sign when team ﬁxed
effects are included. Note that in the data for those regressions, only four bowls included an
unranked team and thus those results could be driven by a few historical rivalries. A key result
from these estimations is that the effect of a championship is statistically signiﬁcant (the sum of
the coefﬁcient estimate on the championship and no. 1 dummies is statistically different from 0
at the 1% level in all six speciﬁcations).
Because Nielsen ratings are given as percentages, simply using OLS for estimation can lead
to problems (for instance, predictions outside the range of possible values). Using appropriate
methods for fractional dependent variables does not qualitatively affect the results. This was
established by transforming the dependent variable into a log odds ratio. That is, the estimates
keep the same sign, and in most cases the same are statistically signiﬁcant. These estimates are
available in Appendix B in Table 10.
An additional concern could be the potential endogeneity of the start of the Bowl Coalition.
Thatis,theBowlCoalitioncouldhavebeencreatedasareactiontothedecliningratings(insteadof
the unraveling problem), which would bias our estimates. To address this concern, we reestimate
the main speciﬁcations on data prior to the start of the coalitions. However, because of the smaller
sample, we cannot control for team ﬁxed effects. The results are similar to those for the same
speciﬁcations over the full sample. The only differences (for the four main regressors: C, One,
Average, and Difference) are the following. C is not statistically signiﬁcant in the equivalent to
speciﬁcation 7. Average is not statistically signiﬁcant in the equivalents to 6 and 7 and in the
equivalent to 5. Difference is positive (as in 5) and statistically signiﬁcant.
22
21 Allowing for year ﬁxed effects allows us to control for the fact that in different years, the schedule of bowls was
different (when different bowls were played). This could be important, as bowls sometimes overlapped. Thus, the fact that
the championship indicator variable still has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate indicates that we
are not confounding the effect of scheduling with that of championships. We also estimate regressions where we control
for the number of bowls played on the same day as the bowl in consideration. If we include a regressor which gives the
number of bowls (excluding the one being considered) on the same day in speciﬁcations 5–10, the coefﬁcient estimate is
always negative but not signiﬁcant in all but one case (spec 8). The average number of bowls on the same day as the 5
bowls in our data does not change much with the coalitions (it is 4.725 before the coalitions start and 4.186 after that).
22 The estimates for the pre-coalitions period are available in online Appendix C in Table 11, which can be found
at homepages.nyu.edu/ gf35/print/online appendix.pdf.
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  Efﬁciency. Figure 1 suggests that the bowl consortia, which established a rotating champi-
onship game, increased the attractiveness of the bundle of bowl games.
Let us now consider how the matching of teams affects the Nielsen ratings. We will focus on
estimates from speciﬁcation 10. Start from the hypothetical case in which a bowl can host a game
between teams ranked 3 and 5. Increasing the rank of the best team by 1 would result in a change
in ratings of  0.389   (3.5   4)   0.074   (3   2) =0.120. The average Nielsen rating (in the
BCS bowls) is 12.59; thus, this represents an increase of about 1% of the average. The effect of
improving the worst team by one rank, from 5 to 4, would be an increase of 0.268 points or a little
above2%oftheaverage. Althoughsmallchanges inNielsenratingsmightrepresentserioussums
of money, these look like modest changes.
23 However, when increasing a team’s ranking by only
one rank means getting the no. 1 team, the effect is large: 2.290   0.389   ( 0.5)   0.074  
( 1) =2.558, or 20.32% of the average. Similarly, going from a no. 1 versus no. 3 match to a
championship (1 versus 2) game would increase ratings by 4.969   0.389   ( 0.5)   0.074  
( 1) =5.237, which represents 41.60% of the average rating.
A more concrete counterfactual can be obtained by estimating the Nielsen ratings as though
the bowl matchups in the coalitions era were realized in the pre-coalitions era. For example, if
the matchups in the four BCS bowls in 1998 (ﬁrst year of BCS) were actually realized in 1991
(the last year before coalitions), we can compute the counterfactual average rating per bowl. The
counterfactual rating is calculated by removing the time ﬁxed effect of the relevant year and
instead giving the 1991 value. We did this for every year of the BCS era, that is, from 1998
on, and found that the average counterfactual rating would be 12.75.
24 The actual average of the
Nielsen ratings of the now BCS bowls in 1991 was 11.05. This represents a 15.37% increase in
average Nielsen ratings.
This is not a negligible increase from a ﬁnancial point of view. Using data from the
bowls aired in 2006 (Rose, Orange, Fiesta, and Sugar), we can estimate that the cost per
rating point for a 30 second ad was $39,163.97 (Image Impact, 2006).
25 Thus, an overall
increase in ratings of 6.8 points (four times the average increase of 1.7 points per bowl), as
suggested by the counterfactual above, would translate into $266,315 increased revenues for each
30 seconds of television ad. This suggests a difference in revenue in the millions of dollars in
television advertising as a result of solely having a championship. For example, in the 2006
BCS championship game (played in January 2007) there were approximately 107.5 blocks of
30 second ads. Of course, we do not know how many television ads were presented in the BCS
bowlsofpreviousyears,ortowhatextentthosevaryperbowl,butusingthisasaguide,itsuggests
an increase in revenues of $28,628,863 for the four bowls combined.
26 (In 2004, the television
revenues of the BCS bowls were reported to be in the neighborhood of $100 million; see, e.g.,
Drape, 2004). Furthermore, this is a clear lower bound on the value of ratings, as it neglects the
value of logo placements on the stadiums, the ﬁelds, the uniforms, and on radio. The combined
valueoflogoplacementsforthesefourbowlsin2006hasbeenestimatedtobeworthbetween$20
and $30 million per bowl (Image Impact, 2006). This is not even considering the other beneﬁts
of matching late, such as the ability to pick better teams for all bowl games.
Because revenues generated by the bowls are shared almost equally among the members of
a coalition, a market organization that allows sufﬁciently late matching to allow a championship
can have beneﬁcial effects on average for every member of the coalition.
23 We have compared increases in only one position, however,. Matching 2 versus 3 instead of for example, 12
versus 13 (as in the 1981 Rose Bowl) would yield an increase in ratings of 3.89, or 30.90%.
24 Using the log odds ratio speciﬁcation suggests an even greater effect of 13.53.
25 According to the Image Impact, 2006 BCS press release, retrieved from www.imageimpact.tv/WhoWeAre/
PressRelease.asp on 3/4/2006.
26 The data were gathered by the authors. This is counting from the block of ads before the game starts until the
block of ads after the game ends. It consists mainly of 30 second ads although it also includes a few ads of 15 seconds.
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5. Conclusion
  Priorto1992,thematchingoffootballteamstopost-seasoncollegebowlshadbecomedeeply
unraveled, with teams and bowls making commitments with as many as four games remaining
in the regular season. This resulted in considerable loss of information: as Table 2 shows, there
is only a 31% chance that an apparent championship match made four weeks early will in fact
remain a championship match by the time the game is played.
In1992,themarketbeganaseriesofreorganizationsintoconsortiaofbowlsandconferences
thathaveallowedmatchingtooccurlater,whenmorereliableinformationonrankingsisavailable,
and among a broader pool of conferences and teams.
27 This has led to more championship games,
which in turn has led to more viewers. To the extent that the number of viewers is a measure of the
output of this industry, this allows us to see how changes in the organization of the market led to
improved matching, and substantially increased output and efﬁciency. The evidence suggests that
further changes in market organization, if they increase the likelihood of producing a “national
champion,” might achieve further gains.
28
Thisarticlebeganwiththeobservationthatmanymarketshaveunraveled,andthatsomehave
reorganized to prevent unraveling and to promote a thick market at a late time. The reorganization
of the football bowl market allows this to be seen clearly. It created a more centralized allocation
process that increased efﬁciency by delaying the market so that it could operate after the end of
regular-season rankings were known, and by allowing matches to be made among the highest-
ranked teams. This increased the efﬁciency of the resulting matchings.
Appendix A
  Appendix A can be found at homepages.nyu.edu/ gf35/print/online_appendix.pdf.
Appendix B
  In what follows, we inspect the ranking of teams picked by top bowls throughout the season. For the BCS era we
use the Rose, Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta (namely four BCS) bowls, for the BA era we use the Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta
(namely three BA) bowls, for the BC era we use the Orange, Sugar, Fiesta, and Cotton (namely four BC) bowls, and for
the decentralized era we use the BC bowls, as well. We exclude the Rose Bowl in all periods except the BCS era, as it
used to select champions of two conferences automatically.
Table 9 reports how the ranking of the best and worst team in these bowls evolves over time and with the different
coalitions. It also looks at the determinants of a championship game (a bowl involving the 1 and 2 ranked teams).
Speciﬁcations 11, 13, and 14 are estimated by OLS.29 For the Best regressions, speciﬁcations 11 and 13, the dependent
variable is the rank of the best-ranked team in a given bowl-year. For the Worst regression, speciﬁcation 14, the dependent
variable is the rank of the worst-ranked team in a given bowl-year. For the Best and Worst regressions, the regressors are
dummies for different time periods (blocks of three years) and, as of 1992, dummies indicating the different coalitions
for bowls that were part of them and a dummy for bowls that are not part of a coalition after 1992 (this represents the
Rose Bowl between 1992 and 1995, and the Cotton Bowl from then on). The excluded category is the three years prior
to the ﬁrst coalition (1989–1991). For the Best regression (11), the time dummies between 1977 and 1988 are not jointly
statistically signiﬁcant (at 10% level), and thus we report speciﬁcation 13, which excludes those.
Looking at Table 9, speciﬁcation 13 is suggestive of the fact that since the BCS has been instated, bowls that are
members of it have showcased a best team with a better ranking than before 1992.30 On the other hand, neither the BC
nor the BA seems to have had a signiﬁcant impact on the rank of the best team. Clearly, bowls that have not been part of
27 Furtherreorganizationinthesamedirectionispresentlybeingcontemplated.Mostrecently,ithasbeenannounced
that a ﬁfth bowl will be added to the BCS (Drape, 2004).
28 Such changes might be in the direction of enlarged consortia, or might be in the direction of a series of playoff
games, as in some other sports.
29 All regressions adjust standard errors to correct for possible correlation within bowls that took place the same
year (see StataCorp, 2001 for details of the speciﬁc correction used).
30 Clearly the impact of time versus the BCS is hard to disentangle. Two points are worth noting, however. First, a
Wald test of the joint statistical signiﬁcance of the time dummies in (11) cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal
to zero. Second, if we compare a speciﬁcation with the time dummies but without the BCS dummy to one with the BCS
dummy but without the time dummies, as in (12), the one with the BCS dummy has a slightly larger R2.
C   RAND 2007.980 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE 9 Evolution of Ranking of the Best and Worst Teams in Each Bowl Matchup
Best
Worst
Regressors Spec. (11) Spec. (12) Spec. (13)
1977–1979  0.6  2.267
(1.312) (1.990)
1980–1982  0.2  1.867
(1.259) (1.983)
1983–1985 0.333 0.867
(1.394) (2.299)
1986–1988  0.467  3.667 
(1.330) (1.943)
BC (1992–1994) 0.183 0.37  0.95
(1.669) (1.125) (2.961)
BA (1995–1997)  0.289  0.102  0.533
(1.283) (0.397) (2.369)
BCS (1998–2005)  1.254  1.068     2.669
(1.272) (0.362) (1.993)
Not BC, Not BA, 3.698  3.885   6.094  
Not BCS after 1992 (1.983) (1.542) (2.547)
Constant 5.067    4.880    11.200   
(1.258) (0.310) (1.907)
Observations 145 145 145
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.
the different coalitions, the Rose Bowl during the BC and the Cotton Bowl since the BA, have been doing worst, that is,
their best team was not as good, when comparing to the years prior to 1992.
For the results for the Worst team, speciﬁcation 14, one result in particular stands out: with the exception of 1983–
1985, all time period dummies (1977–1988) and coalition dummies (BC, BA, BCS) have a negative coefﬁcient estimate.
This indicates that for the 1989–1991 and 1983–1985 time periods, the worst team in any matchup had the worst ranking
of all time periods. In particular, the 1986–1988 period was statistically signiﬁcantly better than 1989–1991. This sharp
decline in quality in the top bowls is suggestive of the reasons that prompted attempts at reorganizing the market. Again
we can see that the bowls excluded from the post-1992 coalitions have not been doing well.
Most results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations: that is, using an ordered logit or ordered probit to estimate
the best and worst team speciﬁcations. One fact that might be of concern is that we are describing the evolution of the
matchups but the Rose Bowl prior to 1998 had pre-arrangements to automatically take conference champions (no at large
TABLE 10 Estimates of the Determinants of Nielsen Rating of a Bowl: Log Odds Ratio
Log Odds Ratio of Nielsen Rating of a Bowl
Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec.
Regressors (5.1) (6.1) (7.1) (8.1) (9.1) (10.1)
Championship .257   .270   .313   0.24 0.283 .515  
(no. 1 vs. no. 2) (0.104) (0.110) (0.156) (0.143) (0.187) (0.249)
No. 1 Ranked Team 0.208 0.204 0.167 0.225 0.176 0.082
(0.129) (0.130) (0.118) (0.163) (0.176) (0.160)
Average Rank (if unranked  .051     .051     .055     .047   .050   .052  
team is not playing) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
Difference in Rank (if unranked 0.012 0.012 0.015  0.008  0.007  0.002
team is not playing) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Rank of Best Team (if unranked  0.001  0.001  0.007 0.038 .047  0.072
team is playing) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.042)
Unranked Team  .952     .923     1.007     1.223     1.397     1.852   
(0.124) (0.129) (0.321) (0.354) (0.339) (0.520)
Continued.
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TABLE 10 Continued
Log Odds Ratio of Nielsen Rating of a Bowl
Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec. Spec.
Regressors (5.1) (6.1) (7.1) (8.1) (9.1) (10.1)
Regular-Season College  0.038 0.061  .160    0.121
Football
Average Nielsen Rating (0.055) (0.048) (0.069) (0.110)
Super Bowl’s Nielsen Rating 0.013  0.003 0.018 0
(0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.036)
Fiesta Bowl 0.071 0.07 0.074 0.273 .314  0.308
(0.094) (0.097) (0.097) (0.179) (0.182) (0.199)
Orange Bowl 0.121 0.123 0.123 .377   .385   .361 
(0.122) (0.124) (0.098) (0.158) (0.161) (0.180)
Rose Bowl .500    .501    .499    .834    .897    .832   
(0.100) (0.103) (0.096) (0.151) (0.175) (0.266)
Cotton Bowl  0.104  0.107  0.073  0.175  0.12  0.008
(0.125) (0.130) (0.112) (0.218) (0.247) (0.249)
Year  .019   .043   
(0.010) (0.012)
1986–1988  0.188  0.286
(0.151) (0.250)
1989–1991  0.319  0.463
(0.186) (0.336)
1992–1994  .407     .523  
(0.109) (0.233)
1995–1997  .233    .555  
(0.108) (0.211)
1998–2000  0.172  .633 
(0.171) (0.362)
2001–2003  0.301  .940  
(0.177) (0.353)
2004–2005  0.284  .907 
(0.217) (0.438)
Constant  2.150     1.904   1.23  0.629
(0.655) (1.094) (0.748) (1.644)
Team dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 105 105 105 95 95 95
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.
selection). Thus, there is no sense in which, for instance, market conditions make them “go early” in some years. Hence
the speciﬁcations of Table 9 were reestimated using alternative samples: that is, excluding the Rose Bowl prior to 1998.
The results are robust to those changes. Estimates are available from the authors.
Table 10 replicates speciﬁcations 5–10 of Table 5 (in the text) using the log odds ratio as the dependent variable.
Appendix C
  Appendix C can be found at homepages.nyu.edu/ gf35/print/online_appendix.pdf.
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